In his Logic of Scientific Discovery, which first came out in 1935, Karl Popper lays out the foundations of his epistemology of the modern natural sciences, as the subtitle of the first edition of the German original indicates. Important sections concern the principle of falsifiability of empirical-scientific theory systems. Attacking a position Popper calls conventionalism, the Logic of Scientific Discovery denies the possibility of an irreversible verification of scientific propositions by contesting the “existence of ultimate explanations”; in the few pages dedicated to the arts, he says of the artist that, though the latter “may freely choose a certain form,” this choice ultimately remains contingent. There is no place beyond contingency in the sciences, philosophy, or the arts. The logic of scientific discovery turns out to be one of contingency. Art, as an art of discovery, has to do with the affirmation of contingency, just like any scientific experiment. The point is to entrust oneself to a certain ignorance and blindness, to affect all knowledge with a constitutive not-knowing, with its blindness, its dizziness and the irreducible remainder of disorientation.