In a lecture during a colloquium at the Collège international de philosophie dedicated to Jean-Luc Nancy in 2002, Alain Badiou called for the distinction of his and Nancy’s thought: a distinction which differentiates between a finite thought of the finite a finite thought of the infinite. Ultimately it is about recognizing the interferences of both positions, as long as the thought of the finite – as Nancy develops it with Heidegger and Derrida – professes to its infinitness (the infinite movement of finite meaning), while Badiou’s insistence on the infinitness of truths can be interpreted as a completion of a bad finiteness (f.e. vulgar positivisms). To quit the thought of the end and finiteness, as Badiou demands, means to get closer to the conflict between finiteness and infiniteness by inventing a dialectic, which distinguishes itself from a Hegelian one by remaining negative, however in a way so that it affirms its negativity – or itself as negativ dialectic. It is this affirmation of an aporetic compossibility of finiteness and infiniteness, of meaning and truth, which philosophical thought shares with the thought of love, which situates itself nowhere but in this conflict, which no thought knows how to mediate. We come across it in all philosophies which elude the alternative between realism and idealism by affirming the compatibility of concept/idea and life. Infiniteness of the concept/idea, despite its historicity; finiteness of life, despite its incommensurability: They do not exhibit any choice, because the „tension“ between both positions „is internal to philosophy“; for philosophy as well as for love, which the event of a marriage connects, in which the finite singularity of the lovers meets the infinite universality of love. Apparently two hyperbolisms coincide here: the hyperbolism of love and the hyperbolism of philosophy. Love, in its opening towards difference, and philosophy, as the exaggeration of thought towards the unthinkable, are connected by a recklessness, which brings them closer to irrationality rather than to rationality. Nevertheless it is a mistake to trust the separability of both spheres. Neither rationality nor irrationality exist per se. Rather, we are dealing with hybrids which touch upon their inconsistency, upon the aporia inherent in them.