In his lectures on Philosophical Terminology, Theodor W. Adorno insists on the connection of identity and the thinking of identity with the principle of synthesis and the concepts of the whole and the one vis-à-vis the dangerous uncontrollability of the non-identical, the diffuse and the many which resists its reduction to the principle of identity. Everything belonging to the side of the subject has the trait of something enduring, of constancy and self-preservation whereas “what itself is not a subject has the character of uncertainty, of openness which evades the reduction to one”. The subject of identity of the self hovers above the abyss of pre-synthetic multiplicity. Philosophy as ontology is an idealist identification and making-identical of what is present which, in Heidegger’s terminology, is the ontic. But did not Heidegger think the ontological difference between the ontic and the ontological, between beings and being at first as an inverse constellation? Beings in Heidegger’s arrangement is the name for the chaotic abyss. It denotes ontic reality which overlays this abyss (which corresponds to being as nothingness or as withdrawal or concealment) like a Deleuzian plane of consistency. The difference between beings and beings would be that between abyss and (always inadequately) grounded facts, in Lacanian terminology, the crevice is between the real and reality. This crevice can be defined as the difference between the universe of certainty which is the world (albeit as an incommensurable and intransparent totality of everything that is) and the truth (the truth of being, as Heidegger says) that postulates the exterior of the world, its essential limitedness. The difference between certainty or knowledge and truth concerns the difference between established, constituted, classified, instituted and archived reality and that which resists its establishment, constitution, classification, institutionalization and archiving. It concerns the incompatibility of two orders of which the first can be described as the order of function and the second as the order of dysfunction. The order of function is the order of the possible and the feasible, the domain of small politics which is the politics of the possible. The order of dysfunction includes what represents itself to the calculus of function as a resistance and disturbance: the impossible, the non-representable and unknowable, the measurelessness or incommensurability of life itself. To it corresponds a politics of the impossible which would be grand politics that interrupts any calculus.