Let us take the definition of nihilism Jean-Luc Nancy proposes. Nihilism, he writes, is nothing but “the final incandescence of sense,” “sense taken to its point of excess.” When sense is driven to the utmost it is extreme sense, external and hyperbolic acumen. Acuminated sense negates itself, hollows itself out, asserts its absoluteness by dissociating itself from all scales of sense and meaning. It is sense apart and, as such, no longer sense. It becomes truth. And this truth is nothingness. As a placeholder of nothingness, the subject is a placeholder of the truth, i.e., of the inconsistency of reality and immanence. To point into the withdrawal means to point at this inconsistency, to which we can assign all sorts of names. Maurice Blanchot speaks not only of the outside, he also says disaster, a term by which he means a magnitude that is incommensurable in that it oscillates between being and nothingness or presence and absence. The disaster is the failure of sense to make sense; sense that misses itself (for instance, by exaggerating itself infinitely), but also the thinking that casts itself into the Foucauldian unthought and is consumed by its fire. The disaster, “not answering to expectations, not allowing the point to be made or the appointed sum to be paid in full,” is “foreign to orientation, even to orientation as disorientation or simple straying” (M. Blanchot). That is why it frees of sense, which is always desired sense, just as any desire is desire for sense. “Desire remains in a relation to the distantness of the star, entreating the sky, appealing to the universe. In this sense, the disaster would turn us away from desire with the intense attraction of the undesirable impossible” (J.-L. Nancy). The task is to get as close as possible to the incommensurable, to nothingness, to the unthought, to truth, to the impossible, to the real, to the disaster, without losing one’s consistency—the minimal consistency of the subject, of thinking—without dissolving, without liquidating oneself. For truth, what is that if not liquid-liquefying sense? As long as there is sense, the subject has solid ground under its feet, or at least that is how it seems (which is not nothing!). Nihilism implies the experience of the liquefaction of sense; my referential system dissolves. Now, there is an alternative to the extremes of naïve sense-worship and suicidal sense-rejection. It requires the willingness to pass through the narrow passage between immanence and transcendence, to acknowledge consensual sense (social rules, economic fact, political rituals, etc.) as a functional magnitude without submitting to it, to understand its groundlessness and relativity without making them the object of melodramatic theatrics. He is a subject who refuses to choose between these pseudo-alternatives, recognizing neither in unconscious conformism nor in the quasi-religious sublimation of nothingness an option for himself.